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Although individual trustees, as opposed to corporate trustees, are
now being employed more frequently than in the past, the tax problems
that may arise from selecting an individual trustee are often not consid-
ered In this Article, Professor Pennell demonstrates that an estate
planner may safely select an individual trustee by usingproperplanning
andprecise drafting. The most effective means of eliminating tax expo-
sure is use of standards to restrict the trustee's discretion. Although
there is a lack of correlation within the Internal Revenue Code among
the standards that qualfifyfor various purposes, Professor Pennell iden-
tyFes a common standard that qualyfes under each provision. He also
discusses other taxation issues that may accompany selection of an indi-
vidual trustee, including problems involving discharge of legal obliga-
tions, revolving doorpowers and the reciprocal trust doctrine. Professor
Pennell concludes by suggesting that because individual trustees can be
safely employed, their use may become increasingly common in the
future.
Selection of an individual trustee is often the result of a process of elimi-
nation or of designation by default, with many potentially suitable corporate
fiduciaries being rejected or unwilling to serve. While it has been alleged that
little thought is customarily' devoted to objective criteria2 which might be
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, and Visiting Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Miami School of Law Graduate Estate Planning Program. J.D. 1975, North-
western University.
1. It has been suggested that many people select a fiduciary with less sophistication than
they use in buying a new car. See Weiss, The Fiduciary: Guidelines for Selection, Powers and
Succession, 33 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax 273, 274 (1975).
2. Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, criteria, which might
be applied in deciding which fiduciary would best serve, ought to include these: (1) what special
skills does the fiduciary possess, or lack, and which skills are necessary or desirable to administer
the particular trust (for example, investment capability and acumen or ability to operate a farm or
other business); (2) what are the attitudes or philosophies of the fiduciary, does the fiduciary have
a track record and, if so, does it portend difficulties or unsatisfactory treatment of the trust and its
beneficiaries (for example, is the fiduciary loathe to retain closely held business stock, is it reputed
to be too conservative in investing, does it tend to go overboard in restricting expenditures by or
for the benefit of beneficiaries or, alternatively, would it have trouble denying inappropriate re-
quests by profligates); (3) what unique problems or exposures does the fiduciary present (for ex-
ample, conflicts of interest due to its other activities and the special nature of the trust or its
beneficiaries, or special exposure to types of regulation such as is noted at text accompanying
notes 115-17 infra); and (4) what special problems does the trust present (for example, assets lo-
cated in several jurisdictions, some restricting or prohibiting involvement of certain fiduciaries).
For a more expansive discussion of related nontax aspects of trustee selection, see Bromberg &
Fortson, Selection of a Trustee; Tax and Other Considerations, 19 Sw. L.J. 523 (1965).
In a few states, an added factor to consider in selecting trustees is illustrated by the prohibi-
tion contained in New York's Estates, Powers and Trust Law, which prevents an individual
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weighed in making any trustee designation, it is probably of greater concern
that even less consideration is given to problems accompanying selection of
either a beneficially interested trustee or an independent individual trustee.
Because of numerous liabilities which may flow from the increasingly com-
mon resort to individual trustees,3 this Article focuses on tax and other
problems that may arise due to selection of such trustees and offers specific
estate planning techniques to minimize or eliminate potential exposure.
I. GRANTOR TRUST EXPOSURE
To the extent a grantor creates a trust during life and retains beneficial
enjoyment thereunder, the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) effectively ignore the trust, treating the grantor as owner of trust
corpus and income.4 In such a case, it would be immaterial who, including the
grantor, was selected as trustee. Similarly, if trustee selection is being consid-
ered in a testamentary plan, or otherwise for any period after the grantor's
death, trustee selection is irrelevant in terms of income tax exposure of the
grantor. If, however, the grantor makes an irrevocable inter vivos transfer to
an individual trustee, retaining no form of interest attracting grantor trust in-
come tax exposure (no reversion,5 no power to alter, amend, revoke or termi-
nate the trust,6 no direct 7 or indirect8 retention of beneficial enjoyment, nor
trustee from exercising discretion to make distributions of income or principal to himself or her-
self. N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 10-10.1 (McKinney 1967). A similar prohibition may exist
by judicial decision in other states. See, e.g., Garfield v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tas Cas. 13,381
(D. Mass. 1980) (beneficiary, as one of several trustees, deemed unable to exercise discretion to
make distributions to himself because trust document did not expressly grant permission so to act).
There also exists extremely limited authority that a merger of the equitable and legal interests in
the trust may occur if one of several beneficiaries acts as trustee of a trust. See 2 A. Scott, Trusts
§ 99.3 (3d ed. 1967). Because both positions are distinctly minority approaches, they will be ig-
nored in this Article, both as criteria to be considered in the selection of trustees and as factors
affecting the consequences of employing beneficially interested trustees.
3. For a number of reasons there has been a growing reluctance to name corporate trustees.
Among the more commonly expressed reasons are: cost; a perception that corporate fiduciaries
are too conservative, cautious and niggardly (an especially serious concern to adult beneficiaries,
such as a surviving spouse, who fear becoming supplicants); a strong criticism of investment per-
formance, including both comparative returns and an almost universal reluctance to experiment
with such nontraditional investments as precious metals or gems, collectibles, options and other
"sophisticated" investment strategies; restrictions, such as alien land laws, which corporate trust-
ees may be more inclined to honor, and a more general sense that corporate trustees know or
understand various laws better than others and often comply (to the trust's disadvantage) when
another, less knowledgeable, trustee would not. Obviously some, and perhaps all, of these objec-
tions are ill-advised; nevertheless, the clear trend disfavors the corporate trustee. This is particu-
larly true among farmers and ranchers who seem to have an inherent dislike for banks and who,
in many cases, only recently have begun even to accept the trust as an attractive estate planning
device.
4. See I.R.C. § 677(a) (1976).
5. Retention of a reversion could generate income tax exposure under Code section 673.
See id. § 673.
6. Retention of any power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate the trust would pose Code
section 676 exposure. Id. § 676.
7. Direct retention of beneficial enjoyment, either income or principal of the trust, would
present Code section 677(a) liability. Id. § 677(a).
8. "Indirect" retention of enjoyment would include designation of any dependent (such as a
spouse or child) as beneficiary of the trust; Code sections 677(a) and (b) would pose the risk of
income tax liability to the grantor. See id. §§ 677(a), (b).
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any administrative power9 ), improper selection of an individual trustee I0 with-
out drafting adequate safeguards into the trust agreement could, nevertheless,
result in unanticipated income tax exposure to the grantor under Code section
674(a).II More specifically, if the trustee of an irrevocable inter vivos trust is a
nonadverse party 12 who may act without the consent of an adverse party 13 and
who may affect beneficial enjoyment of trust income or corpus, income of the
trust will be taxable to the grantor regardless of the manner in which it is
actually applied, notwithstanding the grantor's divestment of all otherwise tax-
able interests and powers with respect to the trust. Avoidance of this grantor
trust treatment is, however, possible.
One means of avoiding section 674(a) grantor trust liability is by selecting
a trustee who qualifies as an adverse party as defined in Code section 672(a),
14
which basically requires that a beneficiary be named as trustee, or by selecting
an "independent" trustee as described in Code section 674(c),15 essentially
meaning selection of an individual who is neither related nor subordinate to
the grantor. 16 If this first approach is chosen, the trustee may possess unlim-
ited powers and discretion over trust income or corpus without risk of income
taxation to the grantor.
In addition, if the trustee is a related or subordinate party not beneficially
interested in the trust, 17 and thus does not qualify for the adverse or independ-
9. Retention of administrative powers could yield Code section 675 exposure. See id. § 675.
10. The problem considered herein is almost never encountered when a corporate fiduciary is
selected due to the independence of such a trustee and the resulting qualification for the Code
section 674(c) exception to section 674(a). See id. § 674. See also text accompanying notes 15-16
infra.
11. I.R.C. § 674(a) (1976):
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in respect of which the
beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income therefrom is subject to a power of
disposition, exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the ap-
proval or consent of any adverse party.
12. See id. §672(b) (defined as any person who is not an adverse party as defined in section
672(a)). See note 14 infra.
13. "Adverse party" is defined in Code section 672(a). See note 14 infra.
14. I.R.C. § 672(a) (1976):
[T]he term "adverse party" means any person having a substantial beneficial interest in
the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power
which he possesses respecting the trust. A person having a general power of appoint-
ment over the trust property shall be deemed to have a beneficial interest in the trust.
15. Code section 674(c) provides that section 674(a) shall not apply to powers "solely exercis-
able (without the approval or consent of any other person) by a trustee or trustees, none of whom
is the grantor, and no more than half of whom are related or subordinate parties who are sub-
servient to the wishes of the grantor." Id. § 674(c). Thus, co-trustees may be named if at least half
are not related or subordinate. See note 16 infra.
16. A "related or subordinate party" is one described in Code section 672(c) as
any nonadverse party who is- (I) the grantoes spouse if living with the grantor, (2) any
one of the following: The grantor's father, mother, issue, brother or sister, an employee
of the grantor, a corporation or any employee of a corporation in which the stock hold-
ings of the grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control; a
subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is an executive.
I.R.C. § 672(c) (1976). For purposes of section 674(c), "subservience" of the related or
subordinate party is presumed under the last sentence of section 672(c) although the presumption
is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. § 674(c).
17. Prima facie by definition of a related or subordinate party under section 672(c), a nonad-
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ent trustee exceptions to application of section 674(a), a second method for
avoiding grantor trust liability is available by drafting the trust to limit the
trustee's power or discretion. By Code sections 674(b) and (d), certain powers
may be granted to certain individual trustees without generating grantor trust
liability under section 674(a). While many of the section 674(b) powers are of
slight or no use in a garden variety trust, 18 the exceptions in sections
674(b)(5)(A) and 674(d) are of true value in many cases. By these provisions,
respectively, any trustee may be given power to distribute corpus pursuant to a
"reasonably definite standard,"' 9 and any trustee other than the grantor or the
grantor's spouse may be given power to distribute income pursuant to a "rea-
sonably definite external standard,"' 20 without generating grantor trust conse-
quences. Because both standards are regarded as being the same,
21
notwithstanding the one word ("external") difference between them, the effect
of these exceptions is to permit any party other than the grantor or his or her
spouse to act as trustee if the grantor is willing to limit the trustee's powers
over both income and corpus with the requisite standard. Thus, either by se-
lection of an adverse or an independent party, or by selecting anyone except
the grantor or his or her spouse and limiting the trustee's powers with the
requisite standard, exposure to section 674(a) grantor trust income tax treat-
ment may be eliminated.
II. USING STANDARDS TO LIMIT DISCRETION
As the foregoing illustrates to a limited extent, the most effective means of
minimizing or eliminating exposure to each of the income, estate, gift and gen-
eration-skipping taxes, when employing individual trustees, is use of standards
to restrict the trustee's discretion. Consequently, in selecting individual trust-
ees and drafting in light of a selection made, it is frequently beneficial to con-
sider available protections under such standards and to rely on the flexibility
afforded thereby. Although the task of drafting standards is complicated by a
regrettable lack of correlation within the Code among the standards that qual-
verse party as a beneficiary will never be related or subordinated with respect to any portion of the
trust as to which the beneficiary's interest will be adversely affected by the trustee's powers.
18. E.g., I.R.C. § 674(b)(2), (3) (1976) (exceptions for powers exercisable only after the expi-
ration of a ten-year period, or exercisable only by will); id. § 674(b)(4) (power applicable only with
respect to charitable beneficiaries); id. § 674(b)(6), (7) (temporary powers).
19. Section 674(a) will not apply to "[a] power to distribute corpus ... limited by a reason-
ably definite standard which is set forth in the trust instrument. . . ." Id. § 674(b)(5)(A). Those
provisions falling within the definition of a reasonably definite standard are described at text
accompanying notes 41-46 infra.
20. Section 674(d) provides that section 674(a) will not apply to "a power solely exercisable
b.. a trustee or trustees, none of whom is the grantor or spouse living with the grantor, to
distribute, apportion or accumulate income. . . limited by a reasonably definite external standard
which is set forth in the trust instrument." I.R.C. § 674(d) (1976). Those provisions falling within
the definition of a reasonably definite external standard are described at text accompanying notes
41-46 infra.
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-l (1960), which, rather than defining "reasonably definite ex-




ify for various purposes,22 as well as by a dearth of consistent guidance from
the courts, 23 it is possible to identify a common qualifying standard under
each relevant provision.
A. Ascertainable Standards
Unquestionably the most commonly utilized and understood standard is
the "ascertainable standard" which, pursuant to Code sections 2041(b)(1)(A)24
and 2514(c)(1), 25 may prevent a power of appointment from being a taxable
general power. If, for example, the trustee is a beneficiary and, as trustee, has
power to make distributions of corpus to himself or herself, use of the requisite
limitation on the trustee's discretion in making distributions will protect the
beneficiary-trustee from both the estate and gift tax exposure otherwise flow-
ing from that power.26 For drafting purposes, the regulations for both sec-
tions27 specify certain standards that qualify as ascertainable standards, along
with several the Internal Revenue Service regards as not qualifying. The "safe
harbor" provisions which qualify include "health," "medical, dental, hospital
and nursing expenses and expenses of invalidism," "education, including col-
lege and professional education" and the terms "support" or "maintenance"
used alone or in conjunction with the phrases "in reasonable comfort," "in
health and reasonable comfort" or "in an accustomed manner of living." Des-
ignated as not qualifying are "welfare," "happiness" and the term "comfort"
when used alone, as opposed to when used in the phrase "sup-
port/maintenance in reasonable comfort."
Beyond the safety provided by these regulations, case law interpreting the
22. See Alessandroni, Tax and Other Implications of Powers Measured by a Definite or As-
certainable Standard, 4 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan. 1 70.900, at 9-1 (1970):
[T]he notion that perhaps there exists a correlation. . . among the various Code sections
dealing with powers controlled by a standard expressed in the governing instrument...
[is] a "triumph of hope over experience". . . . [Tihe Code is a patchwork structure, with
its diverse parts constructed at different times by changing architects with scant attention
to an overall coordinated design.
23. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 28-39 infra.
24. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(l)(A) (1976): "A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for
the benefit of the decedent which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health,
education, support, or maintenance of the decedent shall not be deemed a general power of
appointment."
25. Id. § 2514(c)(1): "A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of
the possessor which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, sup-
port, or maintenance of the possessor shall not be deemed a general power of appointment."
26. Additional protection against adverse consequences under sections 2041 and 2514 is af-
forded by Treasury Regulation sections 20.2041-1(b)(1) and 25.2514-1(b)(1), which each provide
that
mere power of management, investment, custody of assets, or the power to allocate re-
ceipts and disbursements as between income and principal, exercisable in a fiduciary
capacity, whereby the holder has no power to enlarge or shift any of the beneficial inter-
ests therein except as an incidental consequence of the discharge of such fiduciary duties
is not a power of appointment.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(b)(1), 25.2514-1(b)(1) (1958). The foregoing is true even if exercise is not
required to be in strict accordance with state laws governing allocation of receipts and disburse-
ments between income and principal. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 346 (1980).
27. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-(c)(2), 25.2514-1(c)(2) (1958).
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ascertainable standard creates several notable uncertainties for drafting pur-
poses. For example, for another purpose under the gift tax, the regulations
make reference to "a reasonably fixed or ascertainable standard which is set
forth in the trust instrument." In giving examples of such a standard, the regu-
lations state that
[a] clearly measurable standard under which the holder of a power is
legally accountable is such a standard for this purpose. For instance,
a power to distribute corpus for the education, support, maintenance,
or health of the beneficiary; for his reasonable support and comfort;
to enable him to maintain his accustomed standard of living; or to
meet an emergency, would be such a standard.
28
With the exception of the emphasized language, this regulation virtually par-
rots those regulations describing the safe harbors of an ascertainable standard
under sections 2041 and 2514. A natural assumption might be that "to meet
an emergency" would qualify under those sections as well. Nevertheless, the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) has been affirmed in its position under sec-
tions 2041 and 2514 that "emergency"'relates to the "timeliness" of a distribu-
tion, not to need in terms of health, maintenance, support or other
ascertainable standards, and thus does not qualify as a section 2041 or 2514
ascertainable standard.29 Consequently, "emergency" is not a term that may
be used with safety if the ascertainable standard protection for a trustee-bene-
ficiary is sought.
Similarly, several other terms have elicited varying treatment from the
Service and the courts, making their use of questionable wisdom. The word
"comfort," for instance, is acceptable when used within the phrase "sup-
port/maintenance in reasonable comfort," 30 but it is not an ascertainable stan-
dard when used alone.3I Further, notwithstanding repeated admonitions in
the regulations that the word "happiness" is not an ascertainable standard,
32
one recent decision has held it to qualify.
33
Also unsettling is the disparity of treatment of seemingly comparable pro-
28. Id. § 25.2511-1(g)(2) (emphasis added). The regulations under section 674 contain an
almost verbatim provision in describing a "reasonably definite standard." See notes 41-46 and
accompanying text infra.
29. Sowell v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1001 (1980) ("illness or emergency," the former being
ascertainable despite the latter). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7841006, reprinted in 1978 IRS Letter
RuL Rep. (CCH).
30. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c)(2), 25.2514-1(c)(2) (1958).
31. Strite v. McGinnis, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1964), afl'g 215 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964) (both "benefit and comfort" were used and deemed not ascer-
tainable); Stafford v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Wis. 1964) (both "comfort and enjoy-
ment" were used and deemed not ascertainable); Whelan v. United States, 3 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax
Rep. (CCH) 13,393 (S.D. Cal. 1980) ("reasonable support, care and comfort" deemed not ascer-
tainable). But see note 33 infra and compare Tucker v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,026
(S.D. Cal. 1974) ("reasonable care, comfort and support" deemed ascertainable without discussion
whether "comfort" was being regarded as a separate standard standing alone).
32. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c)(2), 25.2511-1(g)(2), 25.2514-1(c)(2) (1958).
33. Brantingham v. United States, 631 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1980) (both "comfort and happi-
ness" were deemed to be ascertainable in a decision that, notwithstanding the court's protestations




visions. For example, a direction to a trustee to distribute "such amounts...
as [she] ... may require, she to be the sole judge" has been held to be not
ascertainable,34 whereas a similar provision to distribute such funds "as he
may from time to time request, he to be the sole judge of his needs" has been
regarded as ascertainable.35 Moreover, "to continue the donee's accustomed
standard of living" is not regarded by the Service as an ascertainable stan-
dard,36 but "to maintain his standard of living" 37 or "to maintain his accus-
tomed standard of living" 38 or distributions for "health, education, support
and maintenance needs consistent with a high standard and quality of liv-
ing"39 are all regarded as ascertainable. Given the apparent similarity of these
provisions, it seems almost nonsensical to suggest that there is indeed a differ-
ence in the settlor's intent; yet, exaggerated importance obviously attaches to
proper drafting of such a provision. Consequently, substantial thought must
be given to fine tuning a document if a beneficiary-trustee is to possess such
powers. Indeed, at least for purposes of sections 2041 and 2514, the only ap-
parently safe course in drafting a standard that is sure to qualify as ascertain-
able is to rely on the strict "safe harbor" provisions in the regulations. Those
provisions, unlike any others, carry the imprimatur of the Service and, despite
uncertainty concerning the outer expanses of the ascertainable standard, may
be relied upon when drafting to grant flexibility to a beneficiary as trustee.
40
B. Reasonably Definite (External) Standards
A second set of standards appears in the grantor trust provisions of the
Code. As an exception to section 674(a) grantor trust exposure, sections
674(b)(5)(A) and (d) effectively ignore trustee powers limited, respectively, by
a "reasonably definite standard" and a "reasonably definite external stan-
34. Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1969) (based on a determina-
tion that the settlor intended the beneficiary to have unfettered right to receive funds).
35. Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 851, 852 (D. Mass. 1960) (tying distri-
butions to "his needs" deemed by the court sufficiently to limit the bounds of any request). But see
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8121010, reprinted in 1981 IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH), in which the Internal
Revenue Service ruled that distributions by a decedent for "needs. . . in the broadest sense" was
not an ascertainable standard, stating that
under [state] law, the term "needs" (standing alone) may impose an ascertainable stan-
dard upon the trustees. . . . We do not agree, however, that this limitation upon the
trustees under state law imposes a standard which relates solely to the donee's needs for
health, education, support or maintenance that is also required by statute.
Id. See also Barritt v. Tomlinson, 129 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1955) (distributions "as she may see
fit" held to be an ascertainable standard because the court imputed the limitation "for her support
or maintenance").
36. See Rev. Rul. 77-60, 1977-1 C.B. 282.
37. Robinson v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 346 (1980) ("maintain her standard of living"
deemed a sufficient limitation to make the total provision ascertainable); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7914036,
reprinted in 1979 IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8121010, reprinted in 1981
IRS Letter RuL Rep. (CCH).
38. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c)(2), 25.2511-1(g)(2), 25.2514-1(c)(2) (1958). These regulations
all basically use this terminology in describing an ascertainable standard.
39. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7836008, reprinted in 1978 IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH).
40. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra, however, for a discussion of one circumstance
when use of an ascertainable standard will not protect against general power treatment.
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dard."'4 t Although alleged to be no different than a qualified "ascertainable
standard" 42 limiting trustee discretion for purposes of sections 2041 and
2514,43 the regulations under section 674 indicate that the two standards are
slightly different.44 To be sure, the terms "education," "support," "mainte-
nance," "health" and "to maintain his accustomed standard of living" are safe
under both sets of standards. However, "reasonable support and comfort" and
"to meet an emergency," while clearly permissible under section 674, are not
strictly ascertainable under sections 2041 and 2514.45 Also, the terms ("plea-
sure, desire or happiness") noted as falling outside the safe harbors of sections
674(b)(5)(A) and (d) differ from those ("comfort, welfare or happiness") fall-
ing outside the safe harbors of sections 2041 and 2514. Further, with respect to
section 674, "if a trust instrument provides that the determination of the
trustee shall be conclusive with respect to the exercise or nonexercise of a
power, the power is not limited by a reasonably definite standard. '46 No such
limitation is found in the ascertainable standard provisions. Despite these dif-
ferences, a strictly ascertainable standard under sections 2041 and 2514 will
serve to protect a trustee-beneficiary for purposes of those sections and will
also qualify for the section 674(b)(5)(A) and (d) exceptions to section 674(a)
grantor trust treatment, so long as the trustee's exercise is not conclusive or
uncontrolled.
In addition to the foregoing, the same standard providing estate and gift
tax protection to a trustee-beneficiary and section 674 grantor trust income tax
protection to a grantor will also provide income tax protection to an individual
trustee who is also a trust beneficiary. Under section 678, a beneficiary as
trustee is treated as the owner of any portion of a trust over which the benefici-
ary has a power to distribute income or corpus to himself or herself, even if no
distributions are actually made. While authority for application under section
678 is scant, it has been held that the same standard defined in section 674 to
prevent grantor trust treatment will serve to prevent section 678 treatment to a
beneficiary-trustee. 47 Thus, an additional advantage may be gained by utiliz-
41. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
42. Alessandroni, supra note 22, 1 70.911, at 9-14.
43. See text accompanying notes 24-40 supra.
44. According to the Service, notwithstanding the inclusion of the term "external" only in
section 674(d), the two standards are the same. See note 21 supra. Under each,
[a] clearly measurable standard under which the holder of a power is legally accountable
is deemed a reasonably definite standard . . . . For instance, a power to distribute
corpus for the education, support, maintenance, or health of the beneficiary; for his rea-
sonable support and comfort; or to enable him to maintain his accustomed standard of
living; or to meet an emergency, would be limited by a reasonably definite standard.
However, a power to distribute corpus for the pleasure, desire, or happiness of a benefici-
ary is not limited by a reasonably definite standard.
Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-1(b)(5)(i) (1960).
45. See text accompanying notes 30-31 & 28-29, respectively, supra. It may be that the
phrase "reasonable support and comfort" as used in Treasury Regulation section 1.674(b)-
I(b)(5)(i) should be read in a fashion similar to "support/maintenance in reasonable comfort," but
there is no assurance that courts would regard the two as being the same. See note 44 supra.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-I(b)(5)(i) (1960).
47. United States v. De Bonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960) (power to consume corpus
limited by "needs, maintenance and comfort"; capital gains in trust not taxed to power holder);
[Vol. 60
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ing such a standard to limit trustee discretion whenever a beneficiary serves as
trustee. By giving proper attention to the drafting of a strictly ascertainable
standard, a beneficiary may be appointed as trustee with discretion to dis-
tribute income and corpus to himself or herself and nevertheless avoid all sec-
tion 678(a), 2041 and 2514 exposure flowing from such trustee discretion.
48
C Defnite External Standards
A third set of standards is important for trustee selection and trust draft-
ing purposes for two reasons. The first reason is that, on occasion, the settlor
of a trust will be treated as, or deemed to possess the powers of, the trustee.49
Should this occur, use of this third set of standards will prevent inclusion of
trust assets in the settlor's gross estate for estate tax purposes under Code sec-
tions 2036(a)(2) 50 and 2038(a)(1). 5 1 The second reason relates to the genera-
Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950), rev'g 14 T.C. 198 (1949) ("needs" deemed a
sufficient limitation); Smither v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Tex. 1952), atf'd, 205 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1953) (power limited by "support, maintenance, comfort and enjoyment").
48. It may be wise estate planning to use such standards to limit trustee discretion when a
beneficiary is not a trustee, in order to avoid any tax consequences flowing from the Service argu-
ing that the beneficiary should be deemed to be or treated as if he or she were the trustee. For a
discussion of several of the circumstances in which such an argument has been or could be made,
see text accompanying notes 83-106 infra.
49. The most common example of when this may occur is illustrated by the last sentence of
Treasury Regulation section 20.2036-1(b)(3): "[I]f the decedent reserved the unrestricted power to
remove or discharge a trustee at any time and appoint himself as trustee, the decedent is consid-
ered as having the powers of the trustee." Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958). For a discussion
of a more invidious application of the same result, see text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
50. See I.R.C. § 2613(c)(3) (1976) ("beneficiary" defined to mean any party with a present or
future power in a trust); id. § 2613(d)(2) ("power" defined to include any ability to alter beneficial
enjoyment of trust income or corpus). If the trustee is an individual assigned to a generation lower
than the grantor, the generation-skipping tax consequences of acting as trustee and the inevitable
termination through death or resignation must be considered unless the trust qualifies for either of
the exceptions provided in section 2613(e). Under section 2613(e)(1), a trustee's powers are ig-
nored if all the beneficiaries are lineal descendants of the grantor and all are assigned to genera-
tions lower than the generation of the trustee. Id. § 2613(e)(1). It is frequently the case that a trust
will not qualify for this exception because, for example, spouses of descendants are beneficiaries
or some beneficiaries are assigned to the same generation as the trustee. The second exception
provided by section 2613(e) protects certain independent trustees. Under section 2613(e)(2), an
individual trustee's powers will be ignored if he or she (I) has no interest or power in the trust
other than as trustee or as a permissible appointee and (2) is not "related or subordinate" to the
grantor, to his or her spouse, or to any beneficiary. Id. § 2613(e)(2). For purposes of determining
relation or subordination, proposed Treasury Regulation section 26.2613-7(b) automatically re-
gards a spouse, parent, sibling, descendant or employee of the grantor or any beneficiary as related
or subordinate. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 26.2613-7(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 120, 129 (1981). In addition,
any employee of a corporation or partnership in which the voting or operating control of the
grantor or any beneficiary is significant, or in which the grantor or any beneficiary is an executive
or partner, is again regarded as related or subordinate. Id. As a consequence, it seems likely that
few individuals, other than professional fiduciaries, will possess the other requisites to act as
trustee and still qualify as not related or subordinate.
As a practical matter, the exceptions provided by section 2613(e) may be of slight significance
in most cases. If a beneficiary with a present interest in the trust is also trustee, exposure to the
generation-skipping tax presumably already exists due to the beneficial interest; acting as trustee
will not, in most cases, increase any exposure to generation-skipping tax attributable to that indi-
vidual. Indeed, perhaps the greatest risk is if the trusteeship lasts after the status of beneficiary
terminates and thus defers any tax consequences on termination of the beneficial interest under
section 2613(b)(2)(B). Even then, deferral will result in harm only if a greater tax would be im-
posed (either because the trust increased in value, or because the deemed transferor's tax base for
computation under section 2602(a)(1) had grown, during the deferral) and use of any tax dollars
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tion-skipping tax and the fact that the trustee will normally possess powers
making it a beneficiary of the trust for generation-skipping tax purposes.52 In
determining the generation-skipping tax status of a trustee, proposed Treasury
Regulation section 26.2613-4(d) states that "a power is a present power if the
property subject to the power would have been included in the estate of the
power holder under section 2036 or 2038 had the power holder been the settlor
of the trust."'53 Though the proposed regulation does not expressly state that
the converse is also true, (that is, that a power is not a present power if it
would not have caused section 2036 or 2038 exposure), it seems fair to assume
both sides of the coin are involved. The importance of this assumption is that
the termination of a future, as opposed to a present, power is not a taxable
transfer for generation-skipping tax purposes.54 Thus, if powers of the trustee
are limited so that they would not cause section 2036 or 2038 exposure if held
by a settlor, termination of those powers will be a harmless termination of
future powers under the generation-skipping tax.
For purposes of sections 2036 and 2038, and thus indirectly for purposes
of the generation-skipping tax, two types of powers are immune. Powers of an
administrative, managerial or ministerial nature will not cause section 2036 or
2038 exposure if they are limited by a fixed or enforceable fiduciary con-
straint.55 Examples of powers falling within the scope of this exception in-
lude a power to allocate receipts between income and principal5 6 and powers
to direct or veto trust investments.57 More important, distribution powers are
deferred does not offset the increase. Consequently, for generation-skipping tax puroses, trustee
selection is significant only when (1) an individual is trustee; (2) he or she is assigned to a genera-
tion below the grantor and does not qualify under section 2613(e)(1) or (2); (3) he or she is not
otherwise a present interest beneficiary of the trust; and (4) termination as trustee generates a tax
that otherwise would not have existed. Because of the operation of the "one time only" rules of
section 2613(b)(7)(B) and the deferral rules of section 2613(b)(2), the only time a significant tax is
likely to be generated due to termination of the trustee's powers is when the trustee is the only
individual assigned to a particular generation below the grantor, or if designation of the individ-
ual made the trust subject to the tax when it otherwise would not have been a generation-skipping
trust.
51. The value of the trust property is included in settlor's gross estate if settlor "retained...
the right ... to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom." I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (1976).
52. The value of the trust property is included in settlor's gross estate if settlor retained the
"power ... to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate [the trust], or where any such power [was] relin-
quished during the three-year period ending on the date of the [settlor's] death.' Id. § 2038(a)(1).
53. Proposed Treas. Reg. 26.2613-4(d), 46 Fed. Reg. 120, 128 (1981).
54. I.R.C. § 2613(b)(1) (1976).
55. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), afi'g 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971), afig
311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (broad management powers will not subject settlor to estate tax
exposure); Old Colony Trust v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1970), afig 300 F. Supp. 1032
(D. Mass. 1969) (purely administrative powers will not generate exposure); C. Lowndes, R.
Kramer & J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes § 8.9, at 158 & § 9.20, at 226 (3d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Lowndes, Kramer & McCord]. See also Joint Comm. on Taxation, General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 567; H.R.
Rep. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3356,
3403, for the generation-skipping tax legislative history stating that the same general exception
shalt apply for purposes of section 2613(b)(1).
56. See, e.g., Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), afi'd per curiam, 450 F.2d
878 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate of Pardee v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); King v. Commissioner,
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exempt under sections 2036 and 2038 if limited by a "definite external stan-
dard," the theory being that such a limitation effectively denies discretion to
the power holder and, therefore, the power ought to be ignored.5 8 As com-
pared to the "ascertainable standard" of sections 2041 and 2514 and the simi-
larly titled "reasonably definite (external) standard" of sections 674 and 678,
the "definite external standard" of sections 2036 and 2038 is the more liberal.
Unlike other standards considered, cases have established such terms as
"emergency, ' '5 9 "welfare,"'60 "comfort" (standing alone)6 1 and "happiness" 62
as qualifying under sections 2036 and 2038. Moreover, terms clearly qualified
under other standards also qualify under sections 2036 and 2038, most notably
including "education,"63 "maintenance" or "support," 64 and varying terms
relative to health or medical care.
65
It seems safe to say that a standard that qualifies as an "ascertainable
standard" will qualify for income tax purposes under sections 674 and 678 as
well as for estate and generation-skipping tax purposes by effectively limiting
a trustee's discretion as required to avoid exposure under sections 2036, 2038,
2041 and 2613. Thus, notwithstanding the disparate standards considered, the
single "ascertainable standard" will protect against exposure under each rele-
vant Code provision. Consequently, whenever the grantor or a beneficiary is,
may become, or may be deemed to be or possess the powers of the trustee,
66
extensive protection from exposure to the income, estate, gift and generation-
37 T.C. 973 (1962), nonacq., 1963-1 C.B. 5; Hall v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 933 (1946), acq., 1946-2
C.B. 3. The similar power to vote stock held in trust is not in all circumstances immune, due to
provisions of Code section 2036(b). By it, retention of power to vote stock transferred to the trust
by te settlor will result in inclusion under section 2036(a)(1), and the Service has ruled that this
provision also includes a power to veto the vote of such stock by someone else. Rev. Rul. 80-346,
1980-2 C.B. 271. Whether this special rule, added as an afterthought to section 2036 for the ex-
press purpose of overruling the decision in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), will be
imported into the generation-skipping tax by virtue of the language of proposed Treasury Regula-
tion section 26.2613-4(d) is a matter of speculation. However, because it is likely that it will be
imported, wise estate planners will draft defensively in anticipation of such a ruling. In this re-
gard, however, see text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
58. See generally Lowndes, Kramer & McCord, supra note 55, § 8.9, at 156 & § 9.20, at 225.
59. See Estate of Budd v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968) ("in the event of sickness, acci-
dent, misfortune or other emergency"); Estate of Pardee v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967),
acq., 1973-2 C.B. 3 ("education, maintenance, medical expenses, or other needs occasioned by
emergency").
60. See Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 878
(2d Cir. 1971).
61. See United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
62. See id.; Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), afld per curiam, 450 F.2d
878 (2d Cir. 1971).
63. See Estate of Budd v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Pardee v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 3; Estate of Weir v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 409
(1951).
64. See United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Estate of Ford v. Commis-
sioner, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aftd per curiam, 450 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate of Budd v. Comis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate ofPardee v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967), acq., 1973-2 C.B.
3; Estate of Weir v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 409 (1951).
65. Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 878 (2d
Cir. 1971); Estate of Budd v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Kasch v. Commissioner,
30 T.C. 102 (1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 6.
66. See text accompanying notes 83-106 infra.
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skipping taxes is available if the estate planner limits the trustee's discretion in
all events with a strictly ascertainable standard as defined in the safe harbors
of the regulations under sections 2041 and 2514.
D. Gifts of Income
When a trustee is also an income beneficiary of the trust, use of an ascer-
tainable standard will offer another form of protection to the trustee. Accord-
ing to the Internal Revenue Service, if such a beneficiary, as trustee, distributes
corpus to a third party pursuant to authority granted in the trust document, the
distribution constitutes a taxable gift of the beneficiary's income interest in the
assets distributed.67 While there is authority rejecting the Service's position,
68
one estate planning approach to the problem bears the Service's imprimatur
and may avoid the need to litigate the issue. Pursuant to the regulations,
69 if
the trustee's powers over corpus are limited by an ascertainable standard, no
gift of the trustee's income interest results from any distribution of corpus.
While other approaches also might serve to avoid exposure to the gift tax,
70
reliance on guaranteed avoidance through use of the same ascertainable stan-
dard used to avoid other income, estate, gift and generation-skipping tax expo-
sure7' is the most attractive alternative.
E. Discharge of Legal Obligations
In one notable situation the use of standards, ascertainable or otherwise,
to limit a trustee's discretion will not prevent estate or gift tax exposure to an
67. Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b)(2) (1958); Rev. Rul. 79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342. Both involve a
beneficiary with a nontaxable inter vivos power of appointment. This is basically what a benefici-
ary possesses as trustee if the trustee's powers are properly circumscribed so as not to constitute a
general power of appointment. Probably the most common example would be a residuary or by-
pass trust in which a surviving spouse is both income beneficiary and trustee with power to dis-
tribute corpus to children during the spouse's overlife.
68. Self v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (holding that the beneficiary has
made no gift of income for two reasons: (1) because corpus distributions necessarily carry all
rights to the income therefrom, the distribution should be viewed as a single transfer of corpus and
not as a gift of a separate income interest; and (2) the trustee's action should be treated as analo-
gous to the situation when another trustee makes the distribution, in which case no gift would
result). Cf. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 532 (D. Md. 1964) (exercise of
inter vivos special power of appointment divested donee of vested remainder interest; court held
that no gift resulted from exercise).
69. Treas. Reg. § 25.251 l-l(g)(2) (1958). Although this section makes no reference to section
25.2514-I(b)(2), it would appear that it should control by virtue of the language in the penultimate
sentence of section 25.2514-1(b)(2), which states that the transfer of corpus "constitutes a taxable
gift under section 2511(a), without regard to section 2514." Id. § 25.2514-1(b)(2).
70. Two alternatives might be to give all discretion over distributions of corpus to a co-
trustee, with a prohibition on the beneficially interested trustee from participating therein, or give
the beneficiary-trustee only a right to receive income in the trustee's discretion rather than an
absolute entitlement to the trust income. Under this latter approach, if the beneficiary has no
"right" to receive income, he or she presumably has no interest that may be the subject of a gift
when the corpus is distributed. If, however, the beneficiary is the trustee who will determine
whether to distribute any part or all of the income, a court might find this approach to be specious.
A third approach to the issue presumably would be to rely on the annual exclusion under Code
section 2503 and the gift tax unified credit entitlement under Code section 2505 to absorb any
expected gift tax exposure.
71. See text accompanying notes 24-65 supra.
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individual trustee. By the same theory found elsewhere in the income72 and
estate73 taxes, and proposed for application under the generation-skipping
tax,74 if trust property is, or may be, applied for the purpose, or with the effect,
of discharging the trustee's legal obligation to support a beneficiary, the trustee
is deemed to possess a general power of appointment.7S Moreover, unlike
other powers that may be "purified" through use of an ascertainable stan-
dard,7 6 such a limitation is ineffective in this situation.
It is an oddity that, if the trustee were the beneficiary, use of an ascertain-
able standard would serve to protect the individual from section 2041 expo-
sure, but when the trustee is only deemed to be benefited by virtue of the
power to make distributions that would discharge a legal obligation of the
trustee, existence of such a standard is irrelevant. 77 The protection afforded by
an ascertainable standard exists only if the standard relates to distributions to
the trustee as holder of the power.78 Unfortunately, distributions to a depen-
72. See I.R.C. § 677(b) (1976) (to the extent income is distributed for the support or mainte-
nance of a dependent of the grantor it is taxed to the grantor as if it had been distributed directly
to the grantor); id. § 678(c) (same treatment applicable to a trustee vice the grantor). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1960) (same treatment is said to obtain to whomever is obligated to
support an income beneficiary who actually receives income distributions); the regulation has
never been applied by either cases or rulings.
73. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1958).
74. Proposed Treasury Regulation section 26.2613-4(c)(3) adopts the position that anyone
whose legal obligation of support may be discharged by trust distributions is a beneficiary of the
trust by virtue thereof, even if not acting as trustee. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 26.2613-4(c)(3), 46
Fed. Reg. 120, 127-28 (1981).
75. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c)(1), 25.2514-1(c)(1) (1958).
76. See text accompanying notes 24-65 supra.
77. See Lowndes, Kramer & McCord, supra note 55, § 12.6. It may seem ludicrous to suggest
that an individual's power to make distributions directly to himself or herself, if limited by the
appropriate standard, is immune from the reach of section 2041 (a)(2), while at the same time a
power, limited by that same standard, to make distributions to a dependent is not immune even
though it is only deemed to be a power to make distributions to himself or herself. Yet this is
clearly the state of the regulations and is probably justified given the wording of section
2041(b)(l)(A).
A subcommittee of the Estate and Gift Tax Committee of the Tax Section of the American
Bar Association is considering a legislative recommendation to deal with this inconsistency. The
subcommittee may propose excepting all powers limited by an ascertainable standard relating to
the beneficiary's health, education, support or maintenance. However, extension of the ascertain-
able standard exception to powers indirectly benefiting the donee may be improper. Under Code
sections 677(b) and 678(c), the same treatment is dictated whenever a power holder may distribute
trust income for the beneficiary's support or maintenance, regardless of whether the power holder
is the grantor of the trust or a nonadverse third party. I.R.C. §§ 677(b), 678(c) (1976). Perhaps the
estate tax consequences also should not differ as between the creator of a power, to whom sections
2036 and 2038 would apply, and a third party, as to whom section 2041(a)(2) applies.
If the legal obligation theory is the basis for estate tax inclusion, sections 2036(a)(1) and
204 l(a)(2) are the analogous provisions, respectively, for grantor and for third-party includibility.
Because section 2036(a)(1) contains no exception to its legal obligation inclusion rules for distribu-
tions made pursuant to an ascertainable standard, perhaps no such exception should apply under
section 2041(a)(2) for distributions subject to inclusion under the same legal obligation theory. If
analyzed in this light, then the absence of the ascertainable standard exception is correct, and the
section 2041(b)(l)(A) exception currently existing for powers limited by standards relating to the
decedent's own health, education, support and maintenance is the aberration. While no sugges-
tion is advanced here to repeal section 2041(b)(1)(A), it is suggested that perhaps it should not be
extended beyond its present scope.
78. Compare Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c)(1) and 25.2514-1(c)(1) (1958) with id. §§ 20.2041-
1(c)(2) and 25.2514-1(c)(2). The former regulations specify that the power to make distributions
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dent are regarded as only indirectly for the benefit of the trustee. Thus, some
other protection against application of the discharge theory is needed.
79
The most direct estate planning defense against application of the dis-
charge of obligation theory, for all purposes throughout the Code, is to include
an Upjohn limitation80 prohibiting the trustee from making any distributions
which would have the effect of discharging any person's legal obligation to
support any beneficiary of the trust. Aside from a possible allegation that the
trustee had breached the trust by making distributions discharging such an
obligation, notwithstanding the prohibition, the Service would effectively be
precluded by such a prohibition from asserting any tax exposure to any obli-
gated person. In practical application, moreover, the prohibition should prove
harmless in terms of trust flexibility for two reasons. First, many trust distribu-
tions provide funds over and above the legal obligation of support owed by
any person to the beneficiary; as a factual matter most trust distributions are
made after any legal obligations have been satisfied. More fundamentally,
local law in the majority of states provides that trust distributions do not dis-
charge a person's legal obligation to support the beneficiary unless the person
is financially unable to provide that support or the trust was established for the
express purpose of supplanting that legal obligation.81 Thus, other than in
discharging a legal obligation is deemed a power exercisable in favor of the decedent or possessor.
The latter regulations consider only standards related directly to the decedent or possessor.
79. Moreover, even if an ascertainable standard would serve as a protection against sections
2041 and 2514 exposure, it would do nothing to eliminate the exposure of proposed Treasury
Regulation section 26.2613-4(c)(3). See note 74 supra. Because the generation-skipping tax is
inapplicable to the extent the estate or gift taxes apply, see I.R.C. §§ 2613(a)(4)(B), (b)(5)(B)
(1976), elimination of exposure to only the estate and gift taxes simply would create exposure to
the generation-skipping tax. Thus, a solution must be utilized to avoid all these provisions,
80. So named after the case of Upjohn v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 112,888 (W.D.
Mich. 1972), in which the question arose whether a prohibition against making distributions dis-
charging a person's legal obligation to support the beneficiary constituted a "substantial restric-
tion" for purposes of Treasury Regulation section 25.2503-4(b)(1). If it did, then no annual
exclusion would be allowed for contributions made to the trust. Citing Williams v. United States,
378 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the Upjohn court held that it did not constitute a disqualifying restric-
tion. 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,888, at 86,078-79. Cf. Rev. Rul. 81-6, 1981-1 C.B. 385 (existence of
prohibition allowed section 678(a) to apply to trust created by parent; see I.R.C. §§ 678(b), 677(c)
(1976)).
81. Probably the most incredible aspect of the discharge-of-obligation theory is that it finds
no support under state law in the vast majority of states and yet has not been realistically chal-
lenged by taxpayers. This may in part be attributable to the fact that "not only is there a lack of
uniformity among the states, there is in many states uncertainty whether [a] parent's support obli-
gation varies with [a] child's resources." Committee Report, Trust Income Taxation and the Obli-
gation of Support, 1 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 327, 331 (1966). However, the following Internal
Revenue Service pronouncements on this issue are accurate summations of the general rules:
The term "legal obligation" includes a legal obligation to support another person if, and
only if, the obligation is not affected by the adequacy of the dependent's own resources,
For example, a parent has a "legal obligation" . . . to support [a] minor child if under
local law property or income from property owned by the child cannot be used for his
support so long as his parent is able to support him.
Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1960). Moreover, "in most jurisdictions, a [parent], if of sufficient ability,
must support, maintain, and educate. . . minor children without resorting to their separate es-
tates or their income derived from property, trusts, or annuities." Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-1 C.B.
23, 23. See generally Ann6t., 39 A.L.R.3d 1292, 1295 (1971); 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child
§ 77 (1971). See also Pennell, Custodians, Incompetents, Trustees and Others: Taxable Powers of
Appointment?, 15 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan. 1602.3 (1981).
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those exceptional cases when the person is destitute or when the fund was
established for the purpose of relieving that person's legal obligation to sup-
port the beneficiary (or in a state which does not follow the majority rule), no
distribution will in fact be prohibited by the Upjohn limitation because no
distribution would have the prohibited effect. Because the proposed genera-
tion-skipping regulations will apply the discharge theory in all cases, regard-
less of the trustee's identity or relation to the beneficiaries, 82 such a prohibition
is likely to become a standard provision in well-drafted trusts in the future. To
preempt application of the discharge of obligation theory, an Upjohn limita-
tion should be included in any trust under which an individual trustee may
make distributions to any of his or her dependents.
III. "DEEMED" TRUSTEES
In two particularly dangerous situations an individual may be deemed to
be, or to possess all the powers of, the trustee. Just as naming an individual as
trustee demands added thought, additional planning is dictated when either of
these situations exists.
A. Revolving Door Power
If the settlor has designated a trustee whose track record, or the lack
thereof, invites concern over future performance, it may be desirable to estab-
lish a method for removal and replacement of the trustee at will. If any indi-
vidual has an unconditional power to remove and replace the trustee and is
not prohibited from appointing himself or herself as successor, all the trustee's
powers will be deemed to be held by that individual. 83 In a recent ruling the
Internal Revenue Service extended this doctrine to cover such a "revolving
door" power, retained by a settlor, to remove and replace trustees, even
though the settlor was specifically prohibited from naming himself as succes-
sor trustee.84 Notwithstanding this limitation, the Service opined that the
mere power to remove and replace trustees, until one is found to the settlor's
liking, is so powerful that the settlor should be deemed to possess all the
trustee's powers. Although this ruling dealt only with the revolving door
power in the hands of the settlor and involved application of sections
2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1), and notwithstanding strong criticism of the ruling
itself, there is current speculation 85 that an analogous ruling will be issued to
apply the same imputation of trustee powers for purposes of sections 2041,
204286 and the generation-skipping tax.87 If this position is ultimately
82. See note 74 supra.
83. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b)(3), 20.2038-1(a)(3), 20.2041-1(b)(1) (1958).
84. Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325, as modified by Rev. Rul. 81-51, 1981-1 C.B. 458,
limiting it to prospective application after October 29, 1979.
85. With respect to both the criticism of Revenue Ruling 79-353 and the speculation associ-
ated with it, see Pennell, supra note 81, 11603.1, and the authorities cited therein.
86. See text accompanying notes 107-10 infra for a discussion of the section 2042 exposure
the revolving door power may present to a given power holder.
87. Intentionally excluded from the list of areas of potential application of the revolving door
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adopted by the courts, possession of such a revolving door power would be
tantamount to being the trustee, with all the exposures attendant therewith
and the need to plan accordingly. For many purposes, the most effective plan-
ning will be to draft the trustee's powers so that, even if imputed to the holder
of a revolving door power, they will generate no adverse tax consequences.
This frequently entails little more than addition of an Upjohn limitation88 and
use of ascertainable standards89 throughout the trust.
For those who are unwilling to shackle the trustee with such limitation
and standards, the alternative is to create a power that does not constitute a
revolving door power, while at the same time insuring the ultimate objective of
not being locked in with an undesirable trustee. The most direct means of
accomplishing this objective is bifurcation of the power, lodging the removal
power in one individual and the replacement function in another.90 Although
it might be argued that the holder of merely the removal power alone is in a
powerful position, being able to remove trustees until an acceptable replace-
ment is finally appointed, the Internal Revenue Service has yet to regard such
a solitary power as causing the same results as the complete power to both
remove and replace. Thus, assuming the absence of any prearranged con-
certed action between the parties holding the bifurcation powers to remove
and replace, this arrangement should fall short of the type of power that would
cause either holder to be deemed to possess the trustee's powers.
Another alternative would be to create a conditional power, relying on
the theory that, if the condition is not met at a particular time, the power
holder would be regarded as not possessing the power. Among various con-
ceivable conditions, one tied to an objective or comparative measure, such as
failure to meet a designated level of investment performance, or a subjective
determination by a disinterested individual or panel that the trustee's perform-
ance does not measure up to the quality the settlor would have expected, are
the most promising.91 Other approaches, so long as not disguised attempts to
create a revolving door power, 92 might be equally acceptable.
power ruling is the income tax. Notwithstanding the decision in Coming v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.
907 (1955), afi'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1957), which would support a revolving door
ruling under section 674, such a ruling under the grantor trust provisions would appear to be
foreclosed by Treasury Regulation section 1.674(d)-2(a), which states that "a power in the grantor
to remove or discharge an independent trustee on the condition that he substitute another in-
dependent trustee will not prevent a trust from qualifying" for the section 674(c) exception for
powers held by an independent trustee. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(a) (1958).
88. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 24-48 supra.
90. Alternatively, the entire power might be given to a third party if he or she has no expo-
sure under the trust by virtue of being deemed to possess all the trustee's powers. Particular
attention, however, must be given to each of the estate, gift and generation-skipping tax conse-
quences thereof.
91. Another alternative may not be safe. Under it the power would be exercisable only at
intervals, such as on a given day of each month or once a year, with the thought that on any other
day the power does not exist. The issue with such a power is whether the failure to exercise it on a
given day when available, with a consequent expiration thereof, would constitute a taxable lapse
for gift tax purposes and, if so, with what value. The absence of any reasonably discernible an-
swer to either of these questions is reason enough to favor a less problematic alternative.
92. For example, the suggestion that the trustee tender a signed resignation, available for
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B. Reciorocal Trust Doctrine
The reciprocal trust doctrine is the second method by which an individual
may be deemed to be trustee of a trust that he or she is not otherwise serving.
Though most commonly encountered under sections 2036 and 2038 of the es-
tate tax, the breadth of the doctrine's applicability is illustrated by an occa-
sional use for income9 3 or gift94 tax purposes. In its traditional application the
doctrine would "uncross" a transaction such as the following: assume that A
creates a trust with B as trustee for the benefit of A's spouse and children;
meanwhile, B creates a trust withA as trustee for the benefit of B's spouse and
children.95 To the extent of mutual value in the trusts as of creation,96 the
doctrine would treat these trusts as if B had created the trust with B as trustee
forA's spouse and children, and as ifA had created the trust withA as trustee
for B's spouse and children.97 As so applied, the result is to treat the trustee as
the settlor of the trust, raising issues of application of the grantor trust income
tax provisions98 and exposure under the estate tax99 due to retained control
over transferred property.
The sole test for application of the doctrine is whether the two trusts are
"interrelated," meaning that they (1) are substantially identical in terms, (2)
were created at approximately the same time and (3) to the extent of their
mutual value, have approximately the same economic effect as if "crossing"
had not occurred.100 It is notable that "uncrossing" for estate tax purposes has
acceptance by the holder at any future time, is not unlike a power to remove. If coupled with a
replacement power, the combination might appear sufficiently like a revolving door power to treat
it identically.
93. See Krause v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 890 (1972), afi'd, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974).
94. See Rev. Rul. 69-505, 1969-2 C.B. 179. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8029001, ieprinted in 1980
IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH), discussed more fully at text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
95. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8019041, reprinted in 1980 IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH), which in-
volved facts that, viewed graphically, would be:
A -> B as trustee for 4's spouse and children
B > 4 as trustee for B's spouse and children.
96. For example, if.4's trust were $50,000, and B's were $75,000, the mutual value would be
all of.4's smaller trust and two-thirds ($50,000/$75,000) of B's trust.
97. Again viewed graphically, the trusts would be deemed to be:
A/ B -> B as trustee for,4's spouse and children.
.4 .4 as trustee for B's spouse and children.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8019041, reprinted in 1980 IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH). See also Estate of
Bischoffv. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977) (basically the same fact pattern except that the benefi-
ciary of each trust was a third party; "uncrossing," however, occurred in the same fashion to treat
A as settlor and trustee of the trust B actually created, and vice versa).
It is interesting that the Service did not assert section 2036(a)(1) exposure in Private Letter
Ruling 8019041 without uncrossing the trusts, based on the fact that each settloer's spouse and
children were beneficiaries and the trustee could have made distributions discharging each set-
tlor's legal obligation of support. See Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1953), rev'g 17 T.C. 1317 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 371 (1953); Estate of Prudowsky v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 890 (1971), ai'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972) (both cases regarding
discharge of obligations as retained enjoyment of income for purposes of section 2036(a)(1)).
98. E.g., I.R.C. § 674 (1976).
99. E.g., id. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038(a)(1). See Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 82-I
U.S. Tax Cas. 13,444 (Ct. CI. 1981) (involving uncrossing of Uniform Gifts to Minors Act ac-
counts established by decedent and spouse with each other as custodian).
100. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), rev'g 393 F.2d 939 (Ct. CL. 1968)
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always occurred at the "settlor level"; in the example, A was deemed to be the
settlor of the trust B actually created, rather than uncrossing at the "trustee
level" by treating A as trustee of the trust A created for A's spouse and chil-
dren.10' This treatment, however, may be subject to change in the future.
In a recent ruling applying the reciprocal trust doctrine for gift tax pur-
poses,102 a father (F) created two trusts, one for each of his children, A and B.
In one, B was named as trustee for the benefit ofA; in the other, A was named
as trustee for the benefit of B. 10 3 Applying the traditional "interrelation" test,
the Internal Revenue Service ruled that the reciprocal trust doctrine ought to
apply but departed from the historical pattern in one significant respect. Be-
cause uncrossing at the settlor level would have produced no change, the fa-
ther being settlor of both trusts, the Service uncrossed the trusts at the trustee
level, treating A as trustee for A and B as trustee for B. Although the ruling
was not issued for estate tax purposes,' °4 and although there is to date no case
or ruling applying the reciprocal trust doctrine for purposes of finding taxable
general powers of appointment under Code sections 2041 or 2514, the clear
import of the ruling is that the deemed trustees are different than the actual
trustees. If this "trustee level" uncrossing is upheld by the courts, it would
mean that crossing trustees to avoid exposure to any of the estate, gift or in-
come taxes' 05 could fail. To prevent exposure, it would be necessary to draft
interrelated trusts as though the beneficiary were the trustee. 10 6 Consequently,
crossing is probably not a wise estate planning alternative to careful drafting
using standards and limitations to avoid tax exposure.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A number of less common issues ought to be considered when naming
individuals as trustees. The first is relevant if the trust might contain life in-
surance policies on the life of a trustee. In such a case, the Internal Revenue
Service has argued vehemently that incidents of ownership held by the trustee
(establishing the "interrelation" test as opposed to any subjective inquiry into the intent of the
parties in creation of the trusts and rejecting any notion of consideration or a quldpro quo as
essential to application of the doctrine).
101. Graphically, it is interesting to note that Private Letter Ruling 8019041 followed the com-
mon application of the doctrine and, thus, did not regard the trusts as if they were
4 > .4 as trustee for A's spouse and children.
B >4 B as trustee for B's spouse and children.
102. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8029001, reprinted in 1980 IRS Letter Rul. Rep. (CCH), in which the issue
was whether child A could be treated as trustee of a trust actually administered by B as trustee.
The Service's objective in "uncrossing" the trusts was to combine,4's voting control of stock held
individually with stock held in the trust, thereby generating a control block premium for valuation
purposes under the gift tax.
103. Presumably the settlor was concerned about exposure under sections 2041 and 2514 if a
child was trustee of the child's own trust. Viewed graphically, the trusts were
F >4 as trustee for B
F >B as trustee for.4.
104. See note 102 supra.
105. See I.R.C. § 2041 (1976)(estate tax); id. § 2514 (gift tax); id. § 678 (income tax).
106. Similarly, if,, were made trustee for B's children and vice versa, exposure would again
result from A being deemed trustee for.4's dependents.
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in his or her fiduciary capacity are sufficient to require inclusion of the pro-
ceeds of that insurance in the insured-trustee's gross estate if he or she dies
while acting as trustee. I°7 Although the Service has prevailed in only the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 08 and has been defeated in whole' 09 or
in part" l0 in four other circuits, the issue remains undecided in the remaining
circuits and the risk of litigation justifies defensive planning to foreclose the
issue. Certainly the most expeditious approach is simply to deny to any
trustee the power to exercise incidents of ownership over any policy of insur-
ance on his or her life. If the inability thus to deal with a policy would be
detrimental, the prohibition could be coupled with designation of a special
insurance advisor to act only for the purpose of dealing with such insurance.
A second issue deserves mention, although there has been no decision
involving it." ' Assume that a beneficiary possesses discretion (limited by a
properly drafted ascertainable standard) to make distributions of corpus to
himself or herself. If the standard triggering the power to distribute is met, but
the trustee chooses not to make the distribution (for example, the trustee
"may" distribute for support rather than the trustee "shall" distribute), has the
trustee been exposed to the gift tax112 by virtue of having had a withdrawal
right that lapsed? If so, should that portion of the trust subject to withdrawal
be treated as if it had been withdrawn and then recontributed, with grantor
trust income tax"13 and estate tax 1 4 exposure as well? Because there is no
direct authority, the cautious approach might be simply to require distribu-
tions ("shall distribute") whenever the standard is triggered. However, if ad-
ministration of the trust will be subject to the scrutiny of counsel, it may be
appropriate to permit the exercise of discretion not to distribute unwanted
sums ("may distribute") if a judgment can be made from time to time that
exposure does not exist under statutory or case law authority as it may
develop.
107. See Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 277, seeking to apply Code section 2042(2), which
provides that a decedent's estate shall include the proceeds of insurance on his or her life if pay-
able other than to the insured's estate, "to the extent ... the decedent possessed at his death any
of the incidents of ownership" over the policy. I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1976).
108. Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976); Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner,
474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973), vacating and remanding 56 T.C. 815 (1971).
109. Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'g 474 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Mo.
1979); Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977), ai'g 398 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.L 1975),
nonacq., Rev. RuL 81-128, 1981-1 C.B. 469 (stating the Service's intent to continue to litigate the
issue presented in all circuits other than the Third); Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1972), alfg 56 T.C. 1190 (1971).
110. In two decisions the courts have rejected the Service's "per se" or absolute rule of inclu-
sion but have upheld the Service if the incidents held as fiduciary could be exercised for the
fiduciary's own economic benefit as, for example, if the trustee was also income beneficiary and
had the ability to surrender a policy for cash, thus increasing the fund producing future income.
See Gesner v. United States, 600 F.2d 1349 (Ct. CI. 1979); Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner,
427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970), afig 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
111. See Horn, Planning Flexible Trusts for Nonprofessional Trustees: Analysis of Choices
for Draftsmen, 4 Est. Plan. 172, 176-77 (1977), containing a discussion of the issue.
112. See I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1976).
113. See id. §§ 674, 677.
114. See id. § 2041(a)(2) (second clause).
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A third consideration relates to a type of provision occasionally found in
trust forms provided by corporate fiduciaries. Certain regulatory reporting
provisions are triggered by the amount of stock a party may vote. 1 5 Espe-
cially with corporate fiduciaries, but also applicable to individual trustees, the
aggregate voting rights held in trusts under administration and otherwise may
be sufficient to trigger reporting requirements. Because disclosure is com-
monly regarded as undesirable, a "boilerplate" trust provision may specify
that voting control of subject stock shall be exercised by someone other than
the trustee, 16 thus removing the element requiring reporting. However, vot-
ing control may be sufficient to treat the holder thereof as a beneficiary of the
trust for generation-skipping tax purposes. 17 Consequently, care should be
exercised to ensure that voting authority is not given to someone whose
designation as a generation-skipping trust beneficiary would generate adverse
generation-skipping tax consequences. Normally, the issue may be avoided if
the vote simply passes to the income beneficiaries of the trust because they are
already present interest beneficiaries for generation-skipping tax purposes.
Otherwise, it would be wise to place the vote with an individual, either as a
trustee or as a special adviser, who generates no added generation-skipping tax
exposure and who is not affected by any regulatory reporting requirements.
A fourth concern relates to a boilerplate provision found in some trusts to
avoid the need to maintain the trust after it has become uneconomically small.
Such "small trust termination" provisions are commonly keyed to a specified
dollar amount; if the trust falls below that amount, the trustee is either di-
rected or authorized to terminate the trust by making final distribution to the
then income beneficiaries." 8 If the trustee is a beneficiary and if the power is
triggered, a taxable power of withdrawal will exist." 9 This taxation usually is
acceptable because the trust is sufficiently small. However, some estate plan-
ners, fearing that inflation will make a figure chosen today unrealistic in the
future, have begun to draft these provisions in a vague or flexible fashion to
avoid using a dollar figure to trigger the provision. As an alternative, the pro-
vision may give the trustee discretion to terminate the trust whenever, in the
trustee's discretion, it would be appropriate to do so. The danger with such a
provision is that the Service may allege that it grants an absolute power of
withdrawal to the trustee who, upon exercising the discretion to terminate the
115. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
116. A typical boilerplate provision might read:
Any security as to which the trustee's possession of voting discretion would subject the
issuing company or the trustee to any law, rule or regulation adversely affecting either
the company or the trustee's ability to retain or vote company securities, shall be voted as
directed by the beneficiaries then entitled to receive or have the benefit of the income
from the trust.
117. See note 57 supra.
118. A typical provision might read:
If at any time a trust hereunder has a market value determined by the trustee of $X or
less, the trustee may in its discretion terminate the trust and distribute the trust property
proportionately to the persons then entitled to receive or have the benefit of the income
thereform.
119. I.R.C. §§ 678, 2514 (1976).
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trust, will receive a share of the distribution. Accordingly, when a beneficiary
is acting as trustee, the provision ought to be set to a clearly specified dollar
amount. In the alternative, the determination of when termination may occur
should be given to some other party.
The final miscellaneous consideration is non-tax oriented. In designating
individuals to act as trustee, attention ought to be given to possible conflicts of
interest. For example, is the trustee a family member who is active in manag-
ing a family business, stock of which is held in the trust? To foreclose any
threat of litigation focusing, for example, upon the trustee's ability to vote
trusteed stock in his or her favor as part of corporate management, a broad
provision might appropriately be included in the trust specifying that acting as
trustee will not disqualify an individual from pursuing other activities, from
accepting remuneration both from the trust and from those other activities, or
from voting stock notwithstanding conflicts which might arise from such other
involvements, and generally indicating the settlor's intent that the two forms of
activity are not mutually exclusive and that a conflict of interest will not con-
stitute a breach of trust.
V. EXCULPATORY AND SAVING CLAUSES
When individuals are selected to serve as trustees, especially individuals
who are family members, close friends or advisors who may be perceived as
making a personal sacrifice by agreeing to serve, it is common to find inclusion
of exculpatory clauses designed to absolve the trustee of any fault in his or her
actions. Also common are tax saving clauses which state in general terms that
the trustee, in effect, shall have no powers generating any unexpected tax ex-
posure. While both types of clauses have distinct limitations,1 20 their use is
probably salutary, provided certain cautions are observed. Exculpatory
clauses should not be drafted so expansively that the fundamental obligation
to act in a fiduciary capacity is removed; otherwise, certain protections appli-
cable only if the power is exercised in a fiduciary capacity will be lost.'
2 1
Moreover, tax saving clauses cannot be relied upon. While they may prove
useful in escaping exposure and almost always will be harmless, they are of
questionable efficacy,' 22 meaning that they cannot be relied upon as a substi-
tute for careful drafting to confront anticipated tax problems.
120. An exculpatory clause, for example, cannot insulate a trustee against liabilities flowing
from bad faith, gross negligence or reckless indifference. See Prochnow, Conflict of Interest and
the Corporate Trustee, 22 Bus. Law. 929 (1967). Tax saving clauses have been challenged consist-
ently by the Internal Revenue Service, its only real concession to the effect of such clauses being
Rev. Rul. 75-440, 1975-2 C.B. 372, stating that such a clause will be honored to the extent it
reveals the settlor's intent when an ambiguity exists requiring the use of extrinsic evidence for
resolution. See Johanson, The Use of Tax Saving Clauses in Drafting Wills and Trusts, 15 U.
Miami Inst. Est. Plan. 2000 (1981).
121. Each of the exceptions for administrative and ministerial powers available under sections
2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1), as discussed at text accompanying notes 55-57 supra, and also available
under Treasury Regulation sections 1.674(b)-l(b)(5)(i), 20.2041-1(b)(1), 25.2511-1(g)(2) and
25.2514-1(b)(1), would be lost.
122. See note 120 supra.
1982]
820 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a common belief among estate planners, often perpetuated by
corporate fiduciaries, that employing individuals as trustees is fraught with tax
dangers and that a trust beneficiary should never serve as trustee. It is not the
intent here to suggest that corporate fiduciaries not be employed. Rather, the
purpose is to illustrate that, by using proper precautions in planning, coupled
with precise drafting, the estate planner may feel safe in employing whomever
is best suited for a particular circumstance. Through expeditious use of ascer-
tainable standards, as defined for power of appointment purposes, together
with installation of an Upjohn prohibition, unnecessary tax exposure to indi-
vidual trustees may be minimized. If effectively accomplished, employment of
even benefically interested individual trustees may be risk-free and may be-
come increasingly common in the future.
